9 min read
How Numero Prepared for Google CASA AL1
A transparent account of how Numero turned a security questionnaire into code changes, repeatable tests, and requirement-by-requirement evidence.
Read articleNumero security transparency
The real story behind our application review: what we changed, how we tested it, what reviewers asked us to prove, and what the current status does and does not mean.

Assessment surface
Requirement rows reviewed across the declared AL1 scope.
Control areas
Authentication through secure configuration and operations.
Current status
Application controls tested; final assessor acceptance is not claimed.
Status as of August 30, 2026: Numero completed the application remediation, live testing, and portal-evidence preparation described here. This is not a claim of certification, Google approval, or final TAC Security acceptance.
Three-part transparency series
These articles are based on Numero's readiness review, remediation report, evidence pack, scan runbooks, and requirement-level portal artifacts.

9 min read
A transparent account of how Numero turned a security questionnaire into code changes, repeatable tests, and requirement-by-requirement evidence.
Read article9 min read
The application controls behind least-privilege Gmail access, encrypted source credentials, revocable sessions, and metadata-only Financial Memory.
Read article10 min read
Why source code alone was not enough, how authenticated scans changed the evidence, and what a clean result does and does not prove.
Read articleAssessment timeline
The evidence pack records a sequence of review, remediation, rejection, stronger proof, and retesting.
July 2026
The website and API were reviewed against the CASA Application Layer 1 questionnaire and OWASP ASVS. The review identified implementation, evidence, and external-artifact gaps.
August 2
Secret validation, key separation, revocable sessions, privacy-safe logging, data retention, deletion, rate limits, TLS checks, and security headers were fixed or strengthened.
August 15
Narrow or source-only submissions were replaced with complete control paths, broader scope checks, new regression tests, and live behavior evidence.
August 29-30
Bounded OWASP ZAP plans and companion black-box scripts were run, results were reviewed, and per-requirement evidence images were prepared for portal submission or resubmission.
What was reviewed
01
OAuth with PKCE, password hashing, account lockout, per-IP rate limits, and Turnstile before credential work.
02
Short-lived access, revocable refresh, Secure and HttpOnly cookies, logout revocation, and password-change invalidation.
03
User-scoped data access, protected modifications, narrow admin access, Origin checks, and secure OAuth callback validation.
04
TLS enforcement, authenticated encryption, strong cryptographic primitives, and indistinguishable failure behavior.
05
Injection defenses, bounded file handling, fixed outbound destinations, safe redirects, and parameterized database queries.
06
Dependency scanning, production fail-closed checks, strict headers, sanitized logs, secret management, and storage clearing.
What changed
Some findings were code defects. Others were missing validation, incomplete tests, or evidence that could not support its own claim. All deserved a concrete disposition.
How proof was built
Complete control paths, commit-pinned references, and regression tests that actively try to break the asserted behavior.
Authenticated OWASP ZAP plans plus focused black-box scripts for session, authorization, injection, and configuration behavior.
Requirement-level statements and images with exact context, while excluding live tokens, customer data, secrets, and raw session history.
Numero's privacy claims are tied to enforceable controls: least-privilege Gmail access, encrypted source credentials, revocable sessions, user-scoped data access, content-free logs, and deletion and retention behavior.
The assessment process does not make incidents impossible. It makes the controls easier to inspect, the evidence harder to overstate, and regressions more likely to be caught by permanent tests and repeatable scans.
Frequently asked
Numero has completed the application-control remediation, authenticated testing, and requirement-level evidence preparation described here as of August 30, 2026. This page does not claim final assessor acceptance, certification, or endorsement until that status is formally established.
CASA is maintained by the App Defense Alliance and built on the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard.
Numero is not affiliated with or endorsed by Google, the App Defense Alliance, or TAC Security. This transparency series describes Numero's own implementation and evidence status as of August 30, 2026.